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REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF PURPOSE IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
MARK V. TUSHNET*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dean Choper, like virtually everyone who has thought about the
religion clauses, finds the Supreme Court's treatment of religion
clause issues unsatisfactory. Although I share that judgment, I be-
lieve that some of Dean Choper's points need elaboration and cri-
tique. In particular, his treatment of the role of purpose in religion
clause jurisprudence is insufficiently sensitive to variations in con-
text, and his discussion of the tension between the clauses is
incomplete.
II. COERCION AND PURPOSE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES
Many observers commenting on the Supreme Court's decisions
regarding voluntary prayer in the public schools appear uncomfort-
able with the Court's simple view that voluntary prayers constitute
an establishment of religion. They seem concerned that few people
would object to a truly voluntary system of prayer, feeling that if
children can just refrain from praying if they do not want to, why
should the Constitution be interpreted to bar a system under
which children who do want to pray are given an organized oppor-
tunity to do so? The objection to so-called voluntary prayer in
public schools, however, is the suspicion that such organized
prayers really are not voluntary.1 Thus, coercion becomes an im-
portant part of the analysis of establishment clause questions.
At first this conclusion appears anomalous. The first amendment
contains a provision that on its face deals with coercion-the free
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
1. I put aside Justice Stewart's position concerning this issue, which would have recog-
nized the possibility of coercion in this setting, but would have placed the burden of estab-
lishing that coercion existed on those challenging the practice. See Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 318 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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exercise clause. If the pressure to participate in prayer is substan-
tial enough, the practice would violate that clause. Why should
pressure that is insufficient to create a free exercise violation none-
theless be relevant to determining whether the establishment
clause has been violated?
Dean Choper offers an analysis that makes coercion relevant
under both clauses. To make out an establishment clause violation,
one must show that the practice at issue coerces-or compromises
or influences religious beliefs in a way that endangers religious lib-
erty-and that the practice has a religious purpose. To make out a
free exercise violation, one must show that the practice at issue
coerces and that it does not serve an overriding secular purpose. I
see two general difficulties with this analysis.
A. The Analysis of Coercion
The first difficulty involves the definition of coercion. Coercion,
compromise, and influence are troubling, in Dean Choper's analy-
sis, because they can threaten religious liberty. In particular, Dean
Choper emphasizes that the state coerces individuals into making
tax payments, and that this practice violates the establishment
clause when the taxes are used to support churches. Dean Choper
relies on abundant historical evidence to support his conclusion
that even the most modest tax support of programs with religious
purposes violates the establishment clause. As Madison wrote, the
expenditure of only three pence of tax money to support religion is
a matter of concern.2
The extraction of money from taxpayers certainly is coercive,
but why does this sort of coercion threaten religious liberty? Dean
Choper rejects the argument that coercion of this sort threatens
religious liberty because it causes discomfort or offense. What is
left is the fact that, by taking money from individuals and using it
for religious purposes, the government makes it relatively more dif-
ficult for those individuals to use their remaining money for pur-
poses that they deem more worthy. Their wealth having dimin-
ished, the individuals have less discretionary money to use for such
purposes.
2. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (circa June 20, 1785), reprinted in 2 WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
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It is not obvious, however, that this definition is sufficient to ac-
count for what ought to be troubling in certain interactions be-
tween religion and government. Most obviously, it seems to divert
attention from the important aspects of Lynch v. Donnelly,' in
which the Supreme Court found that municipal sponsorship of a
creche does not violate the establishment clause, to make the deci-
sion depend entirely on the modest amount of tax funds that were
spent in support of the creche.4 Dean Choper's formulation would
make this tax support the key to a finding of an establishment
clause violation. I would not have been unhappy with the result
that this analysis would have dictated in Lynch, but I have to say
that something rather more important than the use of tax money
was wrong with the City of Pawtucket's behavior in that case. If
Dean Choper's theory would find Pawtucket's behavior, tax sup-
port aside, offensive without making that offense relevant to the
constitutional issue, something is wrong with the theory.
In addition, to the extent that coercion affects liberty by re-
stricting opportunities to use discretionary wealth, Dean Choper's
theory does not seem to take account of what might be called "in-
stitutional coercion." Institutional coercion exists when the govern-
ment creates a set of institutions, none of which individually have
a religious purpose but all of which together create incentives that
influence or, more strongly, coerce choice in religious matters. This
phenomenon probably has as much of an effect on discretionary
choices as does the restriction of income, and therefore it probably
ought to be incorporated into an analysis like Dean Choper's. Un-
fortunately, an analysis of institutional coercion shows how diffi-
cult it is to link the coercion of tax payments to restrictions on
religious liberty.
Two examples are prominent in discussions of the religion
clauses. Supporters of public aid to religion have asserted that the
government's system of subsidizing secular education in the public
schools without subsidizing religious education, coupled with its re-
quirement that children attend schools, has coercive effects, and
3. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. For a generation, one criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been
whether that theory explains why the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), was correct. In my view, a criterion for an acceptable theory of the religion
clauses is whether that theory explains why the Court's decision in Lynch was wrong.
1986]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
that a modest accommodation such as allowing organized prayers
in public schools is necessary to offset this institutional coercion.
Similarly, feminists have argued that the government's system of
financing most medical services, coupled with its refusal to finance
abortion services, has coercive effects-in this instance, the effect
of inducing women to behave in ways consistent with particular
moral-religious views, which, because of the psychological mecha-
nism that leads people to reduce cognitive dissonance, thereby in-
duces them to hold those views.
I do not wish to defend the view that institutional coercion ex-
ists in either of these instances. Rather, I merely want to show that
institutional coercion is a phenomenon that an analysis that in-
vokes coercion ought to address. Any interpretation of "coercion"
that finds coercion in modest tax support for religious activities
ought to have room for some form of institutional coercion as well.
The difficulty, of course, is that the network of governmental activ-
ities is so dense that every practice could be subject to a powerful
claim of institutional coercion. In that event, the concept would
not be able to play any role in deciding religion clause questions.
B. The Analysis of Purpose
The second general difficulty with Dean Choper's theory arises
from the other element of his analysis. His distinction between the
two clauses would collapse if a religious purpose were routinely in-
ferred from the fact that a practice had only a modest secular pur-
pose. At first glance, that inference probably would not be made in
most cases. After all, goals like preserving the fiscal stability of so-
cial insurance schemes surely are substantial secular purposes, and
they seem largely unrelated to religious purposes.
A slight shift in perspective may make the problem more diffi-
cult. Suppose one asks, not whether the program as a whole has a
secular purpose that is not insubstantial, but whether the refusal
to exempt sincere religious believers from the program has such a
secular purpose.' As far as I can tell, the only such purpose availa-
ble for most programs is the administrative difficulty of making
5. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 855 (1978) (criticizing "the error of
equating the state's interest in denying a religious exemption with the state's usually much
greater interest in maintaining the underlying rule or program for unexceptionable cases").
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determinations of sincerity.' Moreover, for many of those pro-
grams, a purpose to burden or to advance religion would be infera-
ble from a state's failure to set up an appropriate administrative
mechanism to sort the sincere from the insincere. Cases like Sher-
bert v. Verner7 certainly seem like legislative oversights, or, per-
haps more precisely, willful misinterpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes in situations in which the motivation for the misreading may
well be hostility to the religious claim.8 One might treat the prob-
lem as susceptible to a constitutional "clear statement" analysis:
perhaps legislatures do occasionally inadvertently fail to provide
appropriate administrative mechanisms to avoid coercing religious
belief or action. The courts should point out these mistakes to leg-
islatures. But if a legislature persists in refusing to provide an ex-
emption from a secular regulation, even though providing the ex-
emption would entail no significant costs, the inference of a
religious purpose would seem rather strong.9 If this analysis is cor-
rect, Dean Choper's proposal ends up not truly distinguishing the
6. One common objection to such exemptions is that people have incentives to claim ex-
emptions from certain programs, such as taxing systems, while they lack such incentives
when other programs are involved. This is one basis upon which Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (considering the need for an exemption from a state's compulsory education
requirement for adolescents to accommodate individuals with religious objections to such
education), can be distinguished from United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 127 (1982) (considering
the need for an exemption from compulsory participation in the Social Security system to
accommodate individuals with religious objections to the system). In addition to the fact, to
which Dean Choper directs our attention, that the person seeking an exemption in Lee also
disclaimed any intention to seek social insurance benefits, and thus might have lacked the
asserted incentive, the situation in Lee also involved the difficult determination of the
sincerity of the claimant. Thus, the fundamental problem is not one of identifying incen-
tives, but one of determining sincerity. In other contexts, the Court has expressed no
qualms about the ability of the government to determine sincerity. See, e.g., United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. In this connection one should note, as the Court did in Sherbert, that prior to the
decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Sherbert no court had interpreted its
state's unemployment benefit statutes to bar payments to people in Sherbert's position. Id.
at 407 n.7.
9. The alternative view of the problem is that Sherbert and Yoder are aberrations and
that the free exercise clause requires no accommodation to religious beliefs in secular pro-
grams. Under this view, however, it is difficult to see what the free exercise clause contrib-
utes to the Constitution that the free speech clause does not. See Marshall, Solving the Free
Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
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two religion clauses: both require coercion, and both require the
presence of a religious or anti-religious purpose.10
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF PURPOSE IN RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
One difficulty with discussions of the religion clauses is that
commentators have been captivated by the attractions of the
three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman." Not that people agree
that all three prongs are equally sensible, that the Court has ap-
plied the test in a coherent way, or even that the test should be
regarded as anything more than a sensible way to start one's think-
ing about the religion clauses; but people do tend to take the test's
reliance on "purpose" as canonical. I believe that this is mislead-
ing. Although the Court has invoked the "purpose" prong in a rela-
tively undifferentiated way, it in fact uses a more complex analyti-
cal scheme. In addition, treating "purpose" as a unitary concept is
unlikely to provide helpful normative guidance in resolving religion
clause problems.
Perhaps our understanding would be deepened by expressly
drawing attention to other areas of constitutional law in which
"purpose" plays a role, such as the dormant commerce clause and
the equal protection clause.1 2 Both of those other areas, for exam-
ple, provide useful analogues to the problem in Larson v. Va-
lente,13 the case involving Minnesota's selective effort to regulate
solicitation by members of the Unification Church. That case
seems to involve a classic gerrymander-that is, a facially-neutral
statute with inclusions and exclusions that give rise to an irresisti-
ble inference of an intent, or purpose, to disadvantage a particular
10. If the establishment clause protects religious liberty to the extent that the free exer-
cise clause does, and the free exercise clause protects religious liberty to the extent that the
free speech clause does, see supra note 9, one wonders what James Madison thought he was
doing in drafting the religion clauses of the first amendment.
11. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
12. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (equal protection); Hunt v. Washing-
ton State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (commerce clause).
13. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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group. 4 Unlike Dean Choper, then, I believe that ordinary purpose
analysis is perfectly acceptable in Larson.
Nevertheless, I agree with Dean Choper concerning the existence
of a special category of problems for which, as he puts it, "strict
scrutiny" is necessary. Dean Choper would include statutes dealing
expressly with religion in that category. As I have suggested, virtu-
ally all statutes dealing expressly with religion are susceptible to
ordinary purpose analysis, but another sort of problem, illustrated
by Epperson v. Arkansas15 and other evolution/creation science
cases,' 6 exists. These cases involve statutes that deal expressly with
the curriculum of the public schools, rather than with religion, yet
everyone knows that religion is the real issue. I suggest that these
cases involve what might be called "religion-sensitive" subjects,
and it may be that the best way to understand Epperson is to view
it as invoking a rule that statutes dealing with religion-sensitive
subjects must survive strict scrutiny.1
Difficulties would arise with this category as well-most notably,
the difficulty in determining what counts as a religion-sensitive
subject. Everyone probably would agree that creation science is
such a subject, but what about abortion?'8 More generally, the
14. Compare the similar expressions about motivation relied on in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977) ("glaring" statement by state
official regarding his desire to "have the sentiment from our apple producers since they were
mainly responsible for this legislation being passed"), and Larson, 456 U.S. at 255 (legisla-
tor's statement that he was "not sure why we're so hot to regulate the Moonies anyway").
15. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
16. See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd,
723 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983).
17. At least this avoids the notorious difficulties that arise when one tries to understand
these cases in more conventional terms, as Justice Black's concurring opinion in Epperson
made abundantly clear. See 393 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
18. Professor Tribe initially argued that statutes restricting the availability of abortion
were unconstitutional because they were motivated largely by a particular, and particularly
religious, view about when human life begins. See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972
Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 18-25 (1973). "[O]n reflection," however, Professor Tribe concluded that this view
"give[s] too little weight to the value of allowing religious groups freely to express their
convictions in the political process." L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 928 (footnote omitted). Pro-
fessor Tribe's initial suggestion was that the religious component of the controversy re-
quired courts to remit the abortion decision to pregnant women; this Comment suggests
that the religion-sensitive nature of the issue authorizes courts to determine on their own
the proper balance between the various interests.
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subjects that can be termed religion-sensitive are likely to change
substantially over time, as society becomes attuned to different as-
pects of religious belief and conflict. Drawing
constitutional doctrine in this manner makes it unstable from the
beginning, which may not be desirable, yet cases such as Epperson
do seem to involve something special that is not captured by a
more straightforward analysis of legislative purpose.
Another set of cases not readily susceptible to analysis under the
ordinary Lemon approach to purpose involves what Dean Choper
calls "deeply ingrained practices" such as legislative prayer. Once
again, however, I believe that the difficulties arise from a mis-
guided effort to use the Lemon approach, rather than from difficul-
ties inherent in the quest for purpose. Years ago, Mark DeWolfe
Howe argued that such practices, which he called "de facto estab-
lishments," had to be analyzed in a special way.19 These practices
plainly have religious purposes, and no good is done by pretending,
as the Court came close to doing in Lynch, that the ordinary un-
derstanding of "purpose" somehow allows a holding that the prac-
tices do not have religious purposes. 2° As Howe suggested, how-
ever, it is unclear why the establishment clause should be
interpreted to prohibit these de facto establishments. The Court's
recent behavior confirms that, whatever the doctrinal rubric, such
practices are almost certain to be found constitutional anyway.
One might as well candidly acknowledge, in our doctrinal struc-
ture, that de facto establishments are constitutionally permissible.
As before, this suggestion does not resolve all problems; one still
must decide what makes a practice a de facto establishment. One
characteristic, suggested by Dean Choper, is that de facto estab-
lishments have a long pedigree.2 ' One legitimately may ask, how-
ever, how long is long enough? A casual survey of the citizenry
probably would reveal that most people believe that public cele-
brations of Christmas date back to medieval times. Justice Bren-
19. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11-12 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (creche must be evaluated "in
its context"); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Court "relegate[s]" creche "to the role of
a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any
inherent meaning").
21. Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding use of chaplains in legislatures
because of historically unique record of acceptance of this practice).
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nan's dissent in Lynch, however, demonstrated that in the United
States such celebrations are only slightly more than a century
old. 2 Similarly, the practice of organized prayer in the public
schools probably seemed well-established in the early 1960's, but it
too was then barely a hundred years old.
Another candidate for a characteristic to identify de facto estab-
lishments is that the religious content of de facto establishments,
while undeniably present, is relatively slight. Sunday closing laws,
or statutes requiring businesses to open no earlier than noon on
Sundays, the time when church services traditionally end, do have
some connection to religion, but not much. Public celebrations of
Christmas have become relatively secularized, though, as Lynch
shows, they still contain some religious elements.25
One advantage of developing a differentiated approach to ques-
tions of purpose under the religion clauses, which identifies
religion-sensitive topics, de facto establishments, and perhaps ad-
ditional categories, is that this approach can direct attention to the
operation of the political process on matters of religion. The ordi-
nary operation of politics these days does not seem likely to pro-
duce legislation that "threatens those consequences which the
Framers deeply feared, ' 24 because pluralist politics operate as to
religion much as they do to any other subject. Differences among
religious denominations' views about the proper stance of govern-
ment toward religion, which range from advocacy of strict separa-
tion to advocacy of benevolent neutrality and beyond, make it dif-
ficult to achieve the sort of consensus on particular programs that
is necessary before a legislature will act. This is particularly true in
the present day when, in addition to the denominational differ-
22. 465 U.S. at 720-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. See id. at 685-86. One difficulty with using this characteristic to identify de facto
establishments is that, as an initial matter, one would think that something like the New
York Regents' prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), would have such slight reli-
gious content as to be a de facto establishment under this approach. The content of the
prayer may have been almost nonreligious, but the fact that it was a prayer probably gave it
sufficient religious content to eliminate the possibility of classifying the activity as a permis-
sible de facto establishment.
24. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[W]e are quite
far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights." (footnote omitted)).
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ences, a strong and highly secularized elite, represented, for exam-
ple, by scholars of constitutional law, oppose substantial
interaction between government and religion.25 Taken together,
these aspects of the political process probably will prevent any-
thing more than the most innocuous and ritualized invocations of
religion from emerging from the political process.
This rosy picture, of course, must be qualified. In our federal
system, denominations that favor substantial interaction between
government and religion may have such control over the political
process in some places that pluralism does not function particu-
larly well. In addition, some practices, perhaps typified by the
creche at issue in Lynch, may be innocuous to a very substantial
proportion of the population but deeply offensive to a proportion
small enough to be dealt out of the pluralist bargaining process.
On the level of strict analysis, I believe that these arguments are
answerable in several ways. 26 One response, however, is more gen-
eral and more important. The qualifications enumerated above
suggest that, while the general operation of the pluralist political
process on matters of religion may be acceptable, the process
sometimes breaks down. Adopting Vincent Blasi's image, the
courts perhaps should adopt a "pathological perspective" of the re-
ligion clauses,27 developing a doctrine that provides the maximum
support for religious liberty when these serious malfunctions occur.
25. An analogy may be drawn between this issue and discussions of Congress' power to
restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, in which the strong scholarly consensus sup-
porting limitations on that power acts as a political force impeding the enactment of
jurisdiction-restricting statutes. See Tushnet & Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress' Power
to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1325-27
(1984).
26. For example, one could redescribe the assertedly troubling exclusion from the bar-
gaining table as one dimension of the diversity that characterizes our federal system, which
is usually considered a virtue. Those who are dealt out of the hand can move to other, more
hospitable jurisdictions, and the threat that they will do so gives incentives to the dominant
majority not to ignore the minority completely. Further, the minority that is ignored locally
need not be ignored at the next higher level of the jurisdictional structure. People harmed
by city ordinances, for example, can appeal to state legislatures for relief, and the fact that
they are not important enough to deal with on the local level does not mean that they lack
sufficient political resources to strike a deal at the state or national level.
27. Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449
(1985).
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This pathological perspective, however, has two problems. First,
it imposes substantial costs on the courts. To preserve the possibil-
ity of invoking a restrictive doctrine when it is really needed, the
courts would have to invoke the doctrine under circumstances that
are, by definition, not pathological. At the least, this would appear
rather silly, resulting in the deployment of big constitutional guns
against what concededly are insubstantial targets. Second, the
pathological perspective assumes that the courts' insulation from
the political process is great enough to ensure, even during times of
stress, that they will be sufficiently steadfast to enforce the restric-
tive doctrines. Courts, however, in many ways surely are not that
different from other political institutions. To make the point most
crudely, one can hardly be confident about the Supreme Court's
ability to stand up to political heat when, in a time when the Court
was not particularly constrained by political considerations, it
managed to decide Lynch as it did.
IV. PURPOSE AND THE ASSERTED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RELIGION
CLAUSES
Dean Choper asserts, as did Justice Stewart," that the Supreme
Court has managed to interpret the free exercise clause in a way
that places the clause in logical conflict with the Court's interpre-
tation of the establishment clause. In this way, too, Dean Choper is
beguiled by a unitary definition of purpose.
As an initial matter, one easily can define the religion clauses so
that they do not conflict. Suppose, for example, that the free exer-
cise clause is interpreted to require, under some circumstances,
that religious exemptions from secular regulations be granted. One
then could interpret the establishment clause to prohibit all stat-
utes that have a religious purpose, except for statutes with the pur-
pose of accommodating religion in ways required by the free exer-
cise clause. Surely the conflict that Dean Choper discerns occurs
only because he believes that the concept of purpose for establish-
ment clause purposes cannot be subdivided as this formulation
suggests. No logical impediment exists, however, to the suggested
definition of the clauses.
28. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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This suggestion may have practical problems. For example, one
formulation might be to permit under the establishment clause
only those statutory accommodations that are required by the free
exercise clause, and to hold unconstitutional all other efforts to
promote "free exercise values." Under this formulation, however,
legislatures would have little incentive to enact statutory accom-
modations. If they failed to enact a required accommodation, the
courts would create one, and if they enacted something more than
what the courts would require independently, their efforts would
go for naught.
This problem could be addressed by introducing some slight
flexibility into the establishment clause standard, which could be
interpreted to allow legislatures some maneuvering room on the
fringes of required accommodations. The courts then would uphold
statutory accommodations that reasonably promoted free exercise
values without unduly impairing establishment clause values."9 Re-
gardless of how one deals with the problems of defining precisely
the relationship between the religion clauses, however, avoidance
of a logical conflict is simple enough, so long as one avoids thinking
that a single concept of purpose must be employed to analyze
problems under both clauses.
IV. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of the religion clauses is a mess, but not, I
think, for the reasons Dean Choper gives. Dean Choper is too con-
cerned about the way the concepts of coercion and purpose operate
in that jurisprudence. The concerns, as he has stated them, could
be alleviated by developing more refined definitions of those con-
cepts. Indeed, I have suggested that the jurisprudence of the reli-
gion clauses is less of a mess, or is a different sort of mess, pre-
cisely because the Court has operative definitions of those concepts
that differ from Dean Choper's. As I have argued elsewhere,30 the
jurisprudence of the religion clauses is a mess not because we do
29. This approach is consistent with some so-called "remedial" views of Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 239-41 (1986).
30. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986).
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not understand the Constitution, but because we do not under-
stand religion.
